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THE ISSUE CLASS 
JOSEPH A. SEINER* 
Abstract: In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court refused to 
certify a proposed class of one and a half million female workers who had alleged 
that the nation’s largest private employer had discriminated against them on the ba-
sis of their sex. The academic response to the case has been highly critical of the 
Court’s decision. This Article does not weigh in on the debate of whether the Court 
missed the mark. Instead, this Article addresses a more fundamental question that 
has gone completely unexplored: what is the best tool currently available for work-
ers to pursue systemic employment discrimination claims? Surveying the case law 
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Article identifies one procedural tool that 
offers substantial potential to workplace plaintiffs seeking to pursue systemic 
claims: issue class certification. Rule 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure permits the “issue class,” which in effect allows a court to certify common is-
sues in a case while allowing the remaining issues to be litigated separately. The is-
sue class is typically used where a case has a common set of facts but the plaintiffs 
have suffered varying degrees of harm. This is precisely the situation that many 
workplace claims present. This Article explains how the issue class is particularly 
useful for systemic discrimination claims. The Article further examines why tradi-
tional class treatment often fails in workplace cases, and addresses how the plain-
tiffs in Wal-Mart could have benefitted from issue class certification. Finally, this 
Article discusses some of the implications of using the issue class in employment 
cases, and situates the Article in the context of the broader academic scholarship. 
If you’re part of a group of employees working for a major U.S. corpora-
tion with a gripe about unfair treatment, your collective voices were poten-
tially muffled [after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes]. 
—NBC News report, following the Wal-Mart decision1 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, heralded last term as 
a game-changer in employment class actions, has lived up to the hype. 
—Reuters News report, following the Wal-Mart decision2 
                                                                                                                           
 * Joseph Seiner is a professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law. The author 
would like to thank Benjamin Gutman, Jocelyn Larkin, Suja Thomas, and Michael Zimmer for their 
helpful thoughts on this Article. The author would like to thank those participants at the Law & Socie-
ty Annual Meeting for their helpful comments on the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart. Any 
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 1 Eve Tahmincioglu, Wal-Mart Ruling Raises the Bar for Class Actions, NBCNEWS.COM (June 
21, 2011, 7:59:35 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43468398/ns/business-careers/t/wal-mart-ruling-
raises-bar-class-actions, archived at http://perma.cc/H4KB-G5E3. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the certification of one and a half million current and former female em-
ployees of Wal-Mart was not consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(a) and Rule 23(b)(2).3 The news reports and legal analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart were largely uniform: the case was a devastating 
setback for millions of workers across the nation.4 The academic scholarship 
quickly followed suit, and decried the decision for significantly raising the bar 
for workers wanting to file suit against employers that run afoul of civil rights 
laws.5 The media analysis and academic reaction to Wal-Mart have largely 
been correct. The decision undoubtedly undermines the ability of workers to 
vindicate their rights when they have suffered discrimination. 
This Article does not take a position as to whether Wal-Mart was properly 
decided. Instead of weighing in on the merits of the case, this Article addresses 
the novel issue of how workplace plaintiffs can still act collectively following 
the decision. This Article thus focuses on how employees can preserve the 
class action mechanism when pursuing litigation after Wal-Mart. 
There are numerous ways that plaintiffs can act collectively when pursu-
ing employment discrimination claims, even in light of the Wal-Mart deci-
sion.6 Previous work demonstrates that collateral estoppel, consolidation, and 
other procedural mechanisms serve as examples of such tools.7 This Article 
expands on that scholarship and focuses on one largely unexplored avenue to 
collective action that is almost as effective as traditional class action litigation: 
issue class certification. Although there is no complete substitute for the tradi-
tional class claim, the issue class offers enormous potential to be the best tool 
currently available to workers pursuing class-wide employment discrimination 
cases.8 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a group of plaintiffs to certify 
certain issues common among them, even when the putative class itself has not 
been certified. Specifically, Rule 23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, 
an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to par-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Andrew Longstreth, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Shakes Up Employment Class Actions, REUTERS (Jan. 
9, 2012, 7:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/10/us-walmart-study-idUSTRE8090132
0120110, archived at http://perma.cc/78VS-VEGL. 
 3 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011). 
 4 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (noting the news response to the Wal-Mart deci-
sion); infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (noting the scholarly response). 
 5 See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the critical reaction of scholars to the 
Supreme Court’s decision). 
 6 See infra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 7 See generally Joseph Seiner, Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2014) 
(addressing the possible procedural responses to the Wal-Mart decision). 
 8 See infra notes 261–267 and accompanying text. 
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ticular issues.”9 Even when a class has not been permitted to proceed under 
Rule 23(b), then, litigants can still certify particular issues common to a class 
under Rule 23(c)(4).10 This Rule thus allows a court to “treat common things 
in common and to distinguish the distinguishable.”11  
Issue class certification offers many of the traditional benefits of class 
certification under Rule 23(b).12 Most notably, the issue class provides trial 
judges enormous flexibility when managing a systemic case of workplace 
harm.13 Although class claims are different, Rule 23(c)(4) allows the judge to 
separate specific common questions in the case and resolve other issues indi-
vidually.14 The judge can thereby tailor the certified issues to the facts of the 
specific case, thus leading to more efficient litigation.15 In this way, issue class 
certification also results in more streamlined proceedings. Courts can resolve 
claims that touch on a common issue a single time, while allowing the remain-
ing issues in the case to be litigated separately.16 
Issue class certification is especially useful in class action employment 
discrimination cases, particularly after Wal-Mart.17 This is because workplace 
class action claims often present the two criteria often required for issue class 
certification: (1) systemic litigation involving a common set of facts; and (2) 
varying degrees of harm amongst the individual plaintiffs.18 Indeed, a survey 
of the case law and literature in this area reveals that three common factors are 
often involved in the outcome of workplace litigation: common corporate poli-
                                                                                                                           
 9 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). Prior to the 2007 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
issue class certification was authorized by Rule 23(c)(4)(A). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (2006) 
(repealed 2007). In 2007, subparts (A) and (B) were removed, and the issue class provision was rela-
beled 23(c)(4); the change did not alter the Rule’s substantive meaning. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1, adviso-
ry committee's note to 2007 amendment (“Subdivisions have been rearranged within some rules to 
achieve greater clarity and simplicity.”); id. 23, advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment (“The 
language of Rule 23 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them 
more easily understood . . . .”). 
 10 See id. (c)(4) (allowing the certification of specific issues in a case). 
 11 See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1790 (3d 
ed. 2005) (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968)). 12 See infra notes 
122–130 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of issue class certification). 
 12 See infra notes 122–130 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of issue class certifica-
tion). 
 13 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790 (noting the flexibility that issue class certifica-
tion can provide to the trial courts). 
 14 See id. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See id. 
 17 See infra notes 131–193 and accompanying text (discussing why Rule 23(c)(4) is particularly 
appropriate for employment discrimination claims). 
 18 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); see also infra notes 97–121 and accompanying text (setting forth 
the requirements of issue class certification). 
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cies, common personnel, and common company practices.19 Specifically, be-
cause employer policies affecting an employee’s terms, conditions, and privi-
leges of employment are often uniform across a business, these cases will fre-
quently present a common set of facts for numerous plaintiffs.20 Moreover, 
because the managers, supervisors, and executive officers are the same at a 
particular company, there are often similar issues when these same “players” 
are involved in the wrongdoing. Finally, workplaces typically involve common 
practices—informal procedures or rules that are often more of an issue of cor-
porate culture than written policy. Cases of discrimination frequently implicate 
these common company practices.21 
Yet, despite their similarities, employment discrimination claims also vary 
substantially from one another.22 Damages, for example, differ broadly among 
discrimination claims.23 That is, even when workplace claims arise from simi-
lar facts, the relief available to plaintiffs varies tremendously across workers.24 
This is true because employees will often have different rates of pay and dif-
ferent positions at the company.25 And, discrimination results in different de-
grees and kinds of psychological and emotional harm for individual workers.26 
Each employee’s specific damages must therefore be determined on a case-by-
case basis. 
Given these similarities and differences, workplace claims are often ripe 
for issue class certification under Rule 23(c)(4). Because they inherently vary, 
discrimination claims will not always be suitable for traditional class treatment 
under Rule 23(b), as the Wal-Mart case clearly demonstrates. As these system-
ic cases will often arise from the same set of facts and involve the same polic-
es, practices, and personnel, however, there will frequently be common issues 
that can be separated out and certified as an issue class. By resolving these 
common issues on a class basis, courts can handle the litigation much more 
efficiently.27  
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 137–162 and accompanying text (discussing the common issues in employment 
proceedings). 
 20 See infra notes 137–162 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract, 29 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 353 (2008) (discussing an employer’s “often informal” regulations 
and practices). 
 22 See infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text (addressing how workplace claims frequently 
differ from one another). 
 23 See infra notes 163–171 and accompanying text. 
 24 See generally Craig Robert Senn, Ending Discriminatory Damages, 64 ALA. L. REV. 187 
(2012) (discussing damages provisions of federal employment discrimination statutes). 
 25 See infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 168–171 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 137–162 and accompanying text. 
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In fact, plaintiffs effectively used issue class certification alleging work-
place discrimination in a case against Merrill Lynch.28 In 2012, in McReynolds 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit held that a group of seven hundred black brokers could 
pursue the common issue of whether an employer’s policies of arranging teams 
and distributing accounts had an adverse effect against minority workers.29 No 
class was certified under Rule 23(b)(3), but Judge Richard Posner, writing for 
a majority panel of the court, allowed this particular issue to be considered on 
a class-wide basis under Rule 23(c)(4).30 The court explained how its decision 
comports with the holding of Wal-Mart, and how resolution of the particular 
issue furthers the Supreme Court’s reasoning.31 This case shows that use of the 
issue class for workplace claims is more than theoretical, and that all employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs contemplating systemic claims should consider 
utilizing Rule 23(c)(4). 
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the Wal-Mart case, and 
discusses the widely held view that the decision largely eviscerates the civil 
rights protections of millions of workers.32 Next, Part II explains the contours of 
Rule 23(c)(4) and how the issue class differs from traditional class treatment 
under Rule 23(b).33 It then clarifies why issue class certification is particularly 
appropriate for employment discrimination cases, and explains how civil rights 
plaintiffs can use the Rule to help avoid the negative implications of Wal-Mart.34 
By way of example, it explores how Rule 23(c)(4) could be utilized in sexual 
harassment cases—one of the most commonly brought employment discrimina-
tion claims.35 Then, Part II navigates Judge Posner’s recent decision certifying 
an issue class in a post Wal-Mart employment case.36 It also examines how the 
plaintiffs in Wal-Mart could have benefitted if they had pursued issue class certi-
fication rather than a traditional Rule 23(b) class.37 Finally, Part III discusses 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. 
 31 See id. at 482–92. 
 32 See infra notes 39–72 and accompanying text (discussing the Wal-Mart decision). 
 33 See infra notes 85–130 and accompanying text (discussing class actions generally and the issue 
class). 
 34 See infra notes 131–193 and accompanying text (addressing how the issue class can be used in 
employment discrimination cases). 
 35 See infra notes 176–193 and accompanying text (discussing how the issue class is particularly 
useful in sexual harassment cases). 
 36 See infra notes 194–234 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s recent deci-
sion on the issue class in a disparate impact employment discrimination case). 
 37 See infra notes 235–255 and accompanying text (examining Wal-Mart from the perspective of 
Rule 23(c)(4)). 
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some of the implications of using the issue class in employment cases, and situ-
ates the Article in the context of the broader academic scholarship.38 
In sum, Wal-Mart presents an enormous challenge for employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs. This Article attempts to identify the best way for work-
place litigants to pursue systemic claims after Wal-Mart, and explains—for the 
first time—how issue class certification can be used to navigate around the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision. This Article seeks to fill the current void in 
the academic literature on Rule 23(c)(4), and attempts to start a dialogue on 
how the issue class can be used as an effective procedural tool for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs post Wal-Mart. The issue class—although perhaps 
somewhat underutilized and misunderstood—is simply the best available solu-
tion to the problem facing workplace claimants. 
I. THE WAL-MART DECISION 
A. The Supreme Court Decision 
In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court considered a case brought by one and a 
half million current and former female employees of the company who alleged 
discrimination on the basis of pay.39 The case was “one of the most expansive 
class actions ever,” and was brought against the largest private employer in the 
United States.40 
The plaintiffs maintained that Wal-Mart’s policy of allowing local man-
agers to make pay and promotion decisions discriminated on the basis of sex 
and resulted in a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.41 The 
workers did not maintain that there was any formal corporate policy of dis-
crimination against females.42 Instead, they argued that the discretion afforded 
to local supervisors was being used to favor male employees.43 According to 
the plaintiffs, then, this policy resulted in an unlawful disparate impact under 
Title VII, as it had an adverse effect on the basis of sex.44 And, because Wal-
Mart was aware of this disparate impact yet did nothing, the plaintiffs contend-
ed that the company should further be held responsible for intentional discrim-
ination under the statute.45 The plaintiffs did not limit their claim to certain 
stores or regions, arguing instead that all women working at Wal-Mart were 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See infra notes 256–286 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of the 
issue class). 
 39 131 S. Ct. at 2547. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 2548. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. 
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affected.46 In support of these allegations, they introduced both anecdotal and 
statistical evidence demonstrating Wal-Mart’s discriminatory practices.47 The 
Court provided a succinct summary of the workers’ claims: 
The basic theory of the[] case is that a strong and uniform ‘corporate 
culture’ permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconscious-
ly, the discretionary decision making of each one of Wal-Mart’s 
thousands of managers—thereby making every woman at the com-
pany the victim of one common discriminatory practice. Respond-
ents therefore wish to litigate the Title VII claims of all female em-
ployees at Wal-Mart’s stores in a nationwide class action.48 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California certified 
the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.49 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
the case to determine whether the lower court had properly applied the class 
action standards.50 
In analyzing the case, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, 
looked to whether the plaintiff had properly satisfied the four requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation.51 In considering these factors, the Court fo-
cused primarily on the commonality requirement.52 This element requires that 
the plaintiff demonstrate “questions of law or fact common to the class.”53 
Emphasizing the large size of the putative class, the Court looked for “some 
glue” to hold the “millions of employment decisions” in the case together.54 
The Court was unable to find a common thread sufficient to warrant class 
treatment under Rule 23. The Court found no “general policy of discrimina-
tion” at the company and instead viewed the case as involving individual deci-
sion makers being responsible for the discrimination.55 The Court also found 
no fault in Wal-Mart’s decision to permit local managers to exercise discretion 
over pay and promotion determinations.56 This type of approach is “a very 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 2549. 
 48 Id. at 2548. 
 49 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
2541; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 187 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 603 F.3d 571 (en 
banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541. 
 50 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (mem.) (granting petition for certiorari). 
 51 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550. 
 52 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (setting forth the four requirements that must be satisfied for a class 
to proceed); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (“The crux of this case is commonality . . . .”). 
 53 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–51 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)). 
 54 Id. at 2552. 
 55 See id. at 2553–56 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)). 
 56 Id. at 2554. 
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common and presumptively reasonable way of doing business.”57 The Court 
did not say that permitting such discretion could never be discriminatory, but 
that here the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that “a common mode of exercis-
ing discretion . . . pervades the entire company.”58 
The Court also concluded that the statistical and anecdotal evidence of the 
putative class was insufficient.59 Regardless of whether the statistics presented 
demonstrated some type of pay disparity, they still failed to establish the com-
monality necessary to certify the class.60 Similarly, the Court found too few 
examples of specific discrimination to warrant any conclusion that there was a 
generalized practice of discrimination at Wal-Mart.61 The Court thus concluded 
that the class members “held a multitude of different jobs, at different levels of 
Wal-Mart’s hierarchy,” across thousands of stores and every state, with numer-
ous policies and different supervisors.62 Thus, the Court stated that the class 
members “have little in common but their sex and this lawsuit,” and, accord-
ingly, the Court denied class certification.63 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by three other justices, dissented 
from the majority opinion.64 The dissent argued that the plaintiffs had demon-
strated sufficient commonality to certify the class, noting that the company’s 
pay practices “operate uniformly across stores.”65 The dissent also maintained 
that there was a common culture at Wal-Mart consisting of “frequent meetings 
to reinforce the common way of thinking, regular transfers of managers be-
tween stores to ensure uniformity [and] monitoring of stores on a close and 
constant basis.”66 This evidence, along with the statistical and anecdotal offer-
ings, led the dissent to believe “that gender bias suffused Wal-Mart’s company 
culture.”67 Thus, the dissent strongly disagreed with the majority’s conclusion 
that there was no commonality in the plaintiffs’ claims, and further disagreed 
with the majority’s decision not to certify the class.68 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. 
 58 See id. at 2554–55. 
 59 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 60 Id. at 2555–56. 
 61 Id. at 2556. 
 62 Id. at 2557 (quoting Dukes, 603 F.3d at 652 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)). 
 63 Id. The Court’s discussion of monetary relief, which is beyond the scope of this Article, is 
omitted here. 
 64 Id. at 2561–67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. at 2563. Justice Ginsburg noted that “Wal-Mart’s delegation of discretion over pay and 
promotions is a policy uniform throughout all stores. The very nature of discretion is that people will 
exercise it in various ways.” Id. at 2567. 
 66 Id. at 2563 (internal quotations omitted). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. at 2563–65. 
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B. Academic Response to Wal-Mart 
The academic response to Wal-Mart was largely uniform. Scholars have 
widely criticized the decision as undermining the civil rights protections of 
workers across the country.69 For example, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky 
maintains that following Wal-Mart, “it will be very difficult for employment 
discrimination claims to be litigated as a class action.”70 Similarly, two other 
scholars have argued that the Court’s decision “may undercut not only class 
actions, but also the procedurally distinct ‘collective actions’ that let masses of 
workers sue for unpaid wages.”71 
The literature criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart con-
tinues to grow.72 These scholars’ arguments are very well founded. It is now 
time to move past this debate, however, and examine how employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs pursuing class claims can respond to the Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart 
v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 77–97 (2011) 
(reading cases to interpret the Supreme Court’s conservative majority’s desire to protect big business-
es and limit remedies for consumers and employees); Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitu-
tional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 593 (2012) (“The Wal-Mart ruling—although procedur-
al—will have a disproportionate impact on particular substantive areas of the law, even within civil 
rights litigation.”); Robert H. Klonoff, Reflections on the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 533, 536–37 (2012) (concluding that Wal-Mart raises the burden for plaintiffs seeking class certi-
fication by requiring the common question be “essentially dispositive” and by giving defendants new 
methods to challenge certification); Alexandra D. Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Ac-
tions, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 553 (2012) (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561) (“Without the 
possibility of what that opinion derisively referred to as ‘Trial by Formula,’ it will be difficult to certi-
fy many class actions.”); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes 
v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 44–45 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2011/18/LRColl2011n18Malveaux.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H648-LK3J 
(concluding that the majority’s opinion will make it more difficult for employees relying on the theory 
of excessive subjectivity as a discriminatory policy to act collectively); Brian R. Martinotti, Complex 
Litigation in New Jersey and Federal Courts: An Overview of the Current State of Affairs and a 
Glimpse of What Lies Ahead, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 564–65 (2012) (stating that Wal-Mart makes 
certification more difficult for plaintiffs by requiring district judges to conduct a “rigorous analysis, at 
times overlapping with the merits of the plaintiffs’ underlying claims”); Judith Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 78, 148–54 (2011) (“These Wal-Mart rulings crafted new impediments to the congres-
sional charter authorizing private enforcement of Title VII as well as to Rule 23’s recognition of dif-
ferent kinds of relatedness . . . as a predicate for aggregation under judicial supervision.”); Eric 
Schnapper, Review of Labor and Employment Law Decisions from the United States Supreme Court’s 
2010–2011 Term, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 329, 329–41 (2012) (outlining the different ways Wal-
Mart will require more of plaintiffs seeking to certify employment discrimination class actions); Su-
zanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36 (“The biggest 
losers in AT&T Mobility and Wal-Mart were not the class members, who deserved to lose on their 
particular claims, but consumers and employees who might wish to bring class actions in the future.”). 
 70 Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 375, 380 (2011). 
 71 Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart Wage 
Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 526 (2012). 
 72 See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s decision. It is thus time to begin a dialogue not on the efficacy of Wal-
Mart, but rather on how plaintiffs can best pursue their claims in light of this 
decision. This Article engages that discussion with an analysis of the best re-
maining tool for pursuing class action claims in the workplace context—the 
issue class. 
II. THE WAY FORWARD: ISSUE CLASS CERTIFICATION 
In its 2011 decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court 
declined to certify a class of one and a half million current and former female 
employees of Wal-Mart.73 Taking the academic commentary on Wal-Mart as 
true, the decision creates a sizeable hurdle for victims of employment discrim-
ination.74 The case substantially raises the bar for plaintiffs hoping to litigate 
systemic claims of discrimination.75 In the employment discrimination context, 
class actions are particularly important, as many individual claims can be for 
small amounts not worthy of pursuit.76 And, class actions can quickly get the 
attention of employers everywhere and encourage them to adopt non-
discriminatory policies.77 These types of claims also punish those employers 
that do discriminate, and compensate all victims of the company’s unlawful 
behavior.78 
This Article thus adopts the two-part approach taken by so many others to 
date: (1) class actions are good for enforcing civil rights law; and (2) the Wal-
Mart decision has made it more difficult to pursue class actions and thus under-
mines the rights of workers everywhere.79 The decision’s reasoning may not be 
definitive enough to know the extent to which the case will redefine the law—at 
least not without taking a step back to see how the lower courts ultimately inter-
pret the decision. Nonetheless, the commentators are largely correct that Wal-
Mart represents a broad strike against workers, and will undoubtedly make it 
more difficult for them to litigate class claims. Thus, although it may be fair to 
                                                                                                                           
 73 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011). 
 74 See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the academic reaction to Wal-Mart). 
 75 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, TRIAL, Nov. 2011, at 54, 56 (stat-
ing that although Wal-Mart may be read as narrowly dealing with large class actions, class actions 
will be more difficult to bring in the future). 
 76 See Pam Jenoff, As Equal as Others? Rethinking Access to Discrimination Law, 81 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 85, 97 (2012) (“[J]udgments in employment discrimination lawsuits are relatively modest com-
pared to other areas of litigation.”). 
 77 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empir-
ical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 887 (2001) (“[C]lass actions received increasing 
attention from policy-makers and the media.”). 
 78 See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 7, at 1344 (discussing the role of class actions in employment 
discrimination cases). 
 79 See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
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quibble with some of the current scholarship at the margins, the main thrust of 
the arguments against Wal-Mart is both sound and well supported. 
This Article does not seek to engage in the debate over Wal-Mart’s im-
pact, as this is well-traveled ground. Instead, it offers one creative way to uti-
lize the class action provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to help 
negate the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision: issue class certification. 
First, Section A of this Part addresses traditional class certification under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and Rule 23(b).80 Section B then discusses 
what issue class certification is, how it can be applied to employment discrimi-
nation cases, and the potential benefit of using this procedural mechanism.81 
Then, Section C walks through how this procedural tool was effectively used 
in a civil rights case following the Wal-Mart decision, in an opinion authored 
by Judge Posner.82 Finally, Section D discusses how the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart 
could have effectively used this mechanism to pursue their claims.83 
At the outset, it is important to make clear that issue class certification is 
not the only way to help circumvent the Wal-Mart decision. Indeed, previous 
scholarship has outlined other effective ways of pursuing systemic discrimina-
tion claims even in light of the Supreme Court’s heightened view of “com-
monality” under the Rules.84 And, this Article attempts to formulate one par-
ticularly useful way for plaintiffs to pursue class action claims after Wal-Mart. 
It therefore attempts to begin a dialogue on the techniques that civil rights liti-
gants can utilize to pursue collective actions. Ideally, it will inspire others to 
offer similar suggestions and engage this debate. 
A. Rule 23 and the Class Action 
The intricacies of the Federal Rules and class actions are well known. A 
brief review of the Rules, however, helps provide some context to the usefulness 
of the issue class. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outlines how 
class actions may be certified.85 To proceed, a class must satisfy all of the provi-
sions of Rule 23(a) and one of the categories set forth in Rule 23(b).86 The vast 
majority of systemic claims are analyzed under these two Rules.87 Rule 23(a) 
sets forth the well-known requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See infra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 97–193 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 194–234 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 235–255 and accompanying text. 
 84 See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 7, at 1352–78 (outlining the governmental, procedural, and dam-
ages responses to the Supreme Court’s decision). 
 85 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 86 See Malveaux, supra note 69, at 35 (“For a case to be certified as a class action, all of the Rule 
23(a) provisions and one of the Rule 23(b) provisions must be met.”). 
 87 See id. 
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and adequacy of representation that must be satisfied for a class to proceed.88 
Rule 23(b) offers three different ways of certifying a class action.89 
A Rule 23(b)(1) class is permitted where individual litigation may create 
“inconsistent or varying adjudications” or judgments that “would be disposi-
tive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudica-
tions or would substantially impair . . . their interests.”90 A subsection 23(b)(2) 
class action is one where injunctive relief would be primarily appropriate.91 
And a Rule 23(b)(3) class is sought where “questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate” and where the “class action is superior to other 
available methods” of adjudication.92 
Notably, 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class certification permits mandatory class 
cases, whereas Rule 23(b)(3) allows “opt-out class actions.”93 The opt-out cas-
es of Rule 23(b)(3) have been the most challenging for the courts, as they have 
often struggled to apply this provision.94 These challenges may stem from the 
fact that the majority of systemic cases seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), 
and that these claims “usually . . . [involve] a high proportion of monetary 
damages.”95 In these types of conventional class cases, the whole case is certi-
fied as a single action by the court.96 
B. The Issue Class 
A separate procedural provision—added in 1966 as an amendment to the 
Federal Rules—can also be used to litigate specific issues in a case.97 Although 
traditional claims brought under Rule 23(b) involve “an all-or-nothing decision 
to aggregate individual cases,” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) allows 
litigants to resolve specific issues in a case on a class-wide basis.98 Or, as is 
more commonly known, this provision provides for “issue class” certification. 
According to the Rule, an issue class may proceed as follows: 
                                                                                                                           
 88 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 89 Id. 23(b). 
 90 Id. 23(b)(1). 
 91 Id. 23(b)(2). 
 92 Id. 23(b)(3). 
 93 See Jenna G. Farleigh, Note, Splitting the Baby: Standardizing Issue Class Certification, 64 
VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1594 (2011) (noting that many courts have “largely merged” Rules 23(b)(1) and 
(b)(2), and that cases often proceed under both provisions). 
 94 See id. at 1594–95. 
 95 See id. 
 96 Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Partic-
ular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 264. The court does not consider 
“whether there are issues in the case that cannot be resolved collectively.” Id. 
 97 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790. 
 98 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); Romberg, supra note 96, at 251. 
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Particular Issues. When appropriate, an action may be brought or 
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.99 
This “little-heralded” Rule is ambiguous, and does not explain when an 
issue class is appropriate.100 Nevertheless, over time a substantial amount of 
litigation and scholarship has helped define the issue class. It is typically used 
where there are common issues present in the case that would apply to the en-
tire class, even where other questions will need to be resolved individually in 
specific cases.101 Thus, it is not uncommon for cases to proceed collectively on 
common questions under Rule 23(c)(4), while other issues are resolved inde-
pendently, such as “questions of reliance[] [and] damages.”102 Courts have 
even applied this Rule in instances where there is only a single issue common 
to the entire class.103 
In proceeding as a Rule 23(c)(4) class, the plaintiffs must quickly—and 
precisely—identify the issue(s) that deserve common treatment.104 This means 
that the plaintiffs must articulate precisely “what issues of fact or law they be-
lieve can and should be resolved collectively” and identify “what issues must 
be resolved individually.”105 The procedural rules require that, “[a]t an early 
practicable time,” the court “determine by order whether to certify the action 
as a class action.”106 Thus, the plaintiffs should move to certify the issue class 
as soon as possible in the case.107 Raising the issue early on can be a double-
edged sword, however, as discovery and other proceedings in the matter may 
require that the specific issue certified be modified or refined as the case pro-
ceeds.108 
In certifying a case under Rule 23(c)(4), the court must still determine 
that the other provisions of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.109 Thus, the issue 
                                                                                                                           
 99 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). See generally Jenna C. Smith, Comment,“Carving at the Joints”: 
Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer Class Actions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2013) (discussing 
issue class certification). 
 100 See Romberg, supra note 96, at 251. 
 101 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 447 
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971) (utilizing the issue class where only a single common issue was present); St. 
Augustine High Sch. v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 270 F. Supp. 767, 774 n.8 (E.D. La. 
1967), aff’d, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968) (same). 
 104 See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 96, at 268 (“The trial court should require the plaintiffs to state, 
quite specifically, the definition of their proposed class.”). 
 105 Id. at 269. 
 106 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
 107 See Romberg, supra note 96, at 268. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See Michael J. Wylie, Comment, In the Ongoing Debate Between the Expansive and Limited 
Interpretations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A), Advantage Expansivists!, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 352 
(2007) (noting that commentators “agree that the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) must be satisfied in 
order for a class to be certified as to a claim or issue”). 
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must share numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representa-
tion for a class to proceed.110 There is substantial debate, however, as to 
whether courts can certify an issue class when the plaintiffs have not satisfied 
the predominance element of Rule 23(b)(3).111 As already discussed, where the 
plaintiffs seek monetary relief in the case, they must typically satisfy this ele-
ment of Rule 23(b)(3).112 This means that, in the majority of class action cases, 
the plaintiffs will have to show that “questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over” other questions.113 Thus, although it is clear that 
plaintiffs seeking issue class certification must establish the four components 
of Rule 23(a), there is less certainty as to what they must establish under Rule 
23(b).114 Moreover, courts have issued varying opinions in this regard.115 
For the most part, appellate courts have agreed that the issue class can 
proceed under Rule 23(c)(4) even where the predominance requirement of 
Rule 23(b) has not been satisfied.116 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sec-
ond, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all followed this more permissive ap-
proach.117 The Fifth Circuit has been more restrictive, however, and initially 
held that predominance was required for issue class certification.118 The court’s 
more recent decisions have relaxed this approach,119 leading some commenta-
tors to argue that the appellate courts are “unanimous in holding that Rule 
23(c)(4) authorizes certification of issue classes” even where predominance is 
absent.120 Others have disagreed with this conclusion.121 The scholarship has 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 111 See Wylie, supra note 109, at 353–54. 
 112 See id. at 352. 
 113 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 114 See id. 
 115 See Mark A. Perry, Issue Certification Under Rule 23(c)(4): A Reappraisal, 62 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 733, 739–40 (2013) (setting forth the treatment of Rule 23(c)(4) by the appellate courts). 
 116 See id. at 739 (discussing the opinion of the Seventh Circuit); Wylie, supra note 109, at 358–
63 (discussing the opinions of the Second and Ninth Circuits). 
 117 See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338; In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 
2006); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Gunnells v. 
Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 438–45 (4th Cir. 2003) (reasoning in dicta that an issue class 
may proceed without first satisfying the predominance requirement imposed by Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 118 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “[a] dis-
trict court cannot manufacture predominance through the nimble use of [Rule 23](c)(4)”). 
 119 See In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 369 n.13 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Rule 23(c)(4) explicit-
ly recognizes the flexibility that courts need in class certification by allowing certification with respect 
to particular issues and division of the class into subclasses.”); Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 
186 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that an issue class satisfied the predominance requirement 
because “the issues to be tried commonly . . . were significant in relation to the individual issues” 
unique to each plaintiff). 
 120 See Patricia Bronte et al., “Carving at the Joint”: The Precise Function of Rule 23(c)(4), 62 
DEPAUL L. REV. 745, 745–46 (2013). Bronte and her co-authors argue that after the Fifth Circuit’s 
more recent decisions, the “circuit split . . . has all but vanished.” Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
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been mixed on the question of whether an issue class should be permitted 
where the requirements of Rule 23(b) have not been satisfied. 
Irrespective of the outcome of the predominance issue, however, issue 
class certification offers great promise as a way for employment discrimination 
plaintiffs to pursue systemic claims even after Wal-Mart.122 Using Rule 
23(c)(4) offers numerous benefits that should make issue certification appeal-
ing to both the litigants and the courts. Two such benefits jump immediately to 
mind—efficiency and flexibility. 
Using the issue class to certify specific questions in a case helps courts 
handle complex matters more efficiently.123 Where a particular question can be 
resolved as a class, that issue only needs to be answered a single time, forgoing 
the need for subsequent litigation.124 This will save an abundance of time and 
resources for the parties, as the rest of the litigation can proceed without the 
need to revisit the common issue in the case. The issue class thus offers “a 
happy medium between individual cases and a global class action.”125 By re-
solving a question only once across a swath of cases, then, the issue class helps 
to streamline the litigation and bring efficiency to the entire judicial process.126 
Additionally, issue class certification provides the trial courts with an 
immense amount of flexibility when addressing systemic claims.127 As all class 
claims are different, Rule 23(c)(4) allows the judge to peel off specific com-
                                                                                                                           
ted). For an example from the recent case law, see In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 811 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that class certification was proper under Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 121 Compare Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 
763 (2003) (“Rule 23(c)(4)(A) in its current form cannot authorize expansive issue class actions. In-
terpreting the provision to do so would require an untenably strained reading of its text, impermissibly 
rewriting Rule 23 by judicial fiat.”), with Wylie, supra note 109, at 372 (“Rule 23(c)(4)(A) in its cur-
rent form should be interpreted expansively to authorize issue class actions. . . . [C]ourts should not 
adopt the limited interpretation because it is on especially shaky grounds given the distortion of the 
language and structure of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) required to facilitate an interpretation that ultimately ren-
ders the provision a redundant expression of what the predominance requirement . . . already im-
plies.”). See generally Perry, supra note 115 (arguing that “issue certification is properly limited to 
bifurcating liability from remedies, and does not allow the certification (or exclusion) of discrete 
claim elements and defenses”). 
 122 This paper does not address the issue of whether predominance is needed to certify an issue 
class. Instead, it assumes the position taken by the majority of courts on the issue that a Rule 23(c)(4) 
class can proceed irrespective of whether Rule 23(b)(3) has been satisfied. See supra note 117 and 
accompanying text. Although this approach seems to carry the day in the appellate courts, the issue 
will not ultimately be resolved until the Supreme Court addresses the matter. 
 123 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790; Romberg, supra note 96, at 299. 
 124 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790 (“[T]he theory of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) is that the 
advantages and economies of adjudicating issues that are common to the entire class on a representa-
tive basis may be secured . . . .”). 
 125 Romberg, supra note 96, at 299. 
 126 See id. (“The efficiency arises from collective resolution of the issues common to the class 
. . . .”). 
 127 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 1790. 
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mon questions in the case and resolve other issues individually.128 Further, 
plaintiffs can use issue certification at any stage of the litigation.129 This type 
of flexibility permits a class case “to be adjudicated that otherwise might have 
to be dismissed or reduced to a nonrepresentative proceeding because it ap-
pears to be unmanageable.”130 Thus the issue class provides essential flexibil-
ity and simplification to otherwise difficult and complex systemic litigation. 
The efficiencies and flexibility that Rule 23(c)(4) provides are particularly 
fitting in the employment discrimination context.131 Again, the issue class is 
particularly appropriate where there are common facts among the litigants but 
individual differences as to the degree of harm that has been suffered. Systemic 
employment discrimination claims frequently involve this exact scenario, 
providing a common set of facts that give rise to the company’s wrongdoing.132 
Further, the employer’s discrimination often impacts plaintiffs to varying de-
grees, both financially and emotionally.133 Thus, the common set of facts com-
bined with the varying level of harm make the issue class a particularly useful 
tool for employment discrimination litigants. 
The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart were unable to certify their claim as a tradi-
tional class action under Rule 23(b) because of a lack of commonality across 
plaintiffs and stores.134 Yet, despite the differences among the claims, there 
were still common issues in the case.135 Issue class certification could thus 
have provided a useful and efficient way of analyzing that particular litigation. 
Section D of this Part sets forth in detail how Rule 23(c)(4) might have been 
used to benefit the Wal-Mart litigation.136 Beyond the Wal-Mart example, 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See id. (“[S]ubdivision (c)(4) is designed to give the court additional flexibility in handling 
class actions . . . .”). 
 129 See id. (“Several courts thus have noted at the certification stage that allegations about poten-
tial conflicts among class members or manageability concerns may be handled later in the litigation by 
utilizing Rule 23(c)(4).”). 
 130 Id. 
 131 The issue class is not appropriate in all mass litigation. See Romberg, supra note 96, at 299 
(“For a controversy with little in the way of severable common issues, certification may well not be 
worth the bother—individual lawsuits will be superior. For a controversy that is entirely composed of 
common issues, a global class action will be superior.”). For example, where it is difficult to identify 
an issue that can be easily separated out in the litigation, issue certification would not be proper. See 
id. Similarly, where numerous common questions exist across plaintiffs, a traditional class action—
rather than an issue class—should be pursued. See id. Nonetheless, issue certification will often be 
superior for “those downstream cases in which there is a significant common nucleus of operative 
facts concerning the propriety of the defendant’s conduct . . . yet widespread variation in how or if 
that conduct . . . has harmed class members.” Id. at 299–300. 
 132 See infra notes 137–162 and accompanying text (outlining the common issues in Title VII 
litigation). 
 133 See infra notes 163–175 and accompanying text (outlining the differences among discrimina-
tion claims). 
 134 See 131 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 135 See id. at 2547–48. 
 136 See infra notes 235–255 and accompanying text. 
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however, the issue class is promising for all workplace plaintiffs pursuing sys-
temic claims. As Wal-Mart shows, these cases are ripe for issue class certifica-
tion, as they frequently offer both a common set of facts to all plaintiffs and 
individual variances among specific plaintiffs. 
The common issues in employment proceedings abound, as do the individ-
ual differences among litigants. A survey of the case law and literature in this 
area reveals many common factors among workplace claims. The most common 
similarities in Title VII litigation can be broken down into three areas: (1) com-
mon companywide policies; (2) common personnel; and (3) common practices. 
1. Corporate Policies 
It is very common for a corporation to adopt formal, company-wide poli-
cies. Specifically, companies frequently adopt a variety of policies related to a 
worker’s employment.137 These polices are often introduced to employees as 
part of their orientation process and set out in an employee handbook.138 Em-
ployers may announce and adopt other policies over the course of an individual’s 
employment.139 These policies vary in scope and can range from the minutia of a 
worker’s employment to the major components of an individual’s job.140 
For example, formal company policies often include such issues as vaca-
tion and leave rules, pay and promotion policies, discipline guidelines, benefit 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See, e.g., Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family Responsibili-
ties Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1305 (2008) (“Formal poli-
cies can be important evidence in discrimination cases . . . .”); Grace S. Ho, Not Quite Rights: How 
the Unwelcomeness Element in Sexual Harassment Law Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Po-
tential, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 131, 143 (2008) (noting that “[e]mpirical studies have found that 
sexual harassment policies proliferated in the wake of” Supreme Court case law); Sharon Rabin-
Margalioth, Love at Work, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 237, 238 (2006) (noting that “employers 
have instituted a variety of rules and policies that regulate the extent to which employees are allowed 
to personally interact with one another”); Joshua C. Polster, Note, Workplace Grievance Procedures: 
Signaling Fairness but Escalating Commitment, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 638, 638 (2011) (“Over the last 
fifty years, nonunion employers have increasingly adopted formal grievance procedures, which allow 
employees to challenge a company decision or policy and appeal manager adjudications of the chal-
lenge.”). 
 138 See Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. 
REL. L.J. 326, 334–35 (1993) (“Employee handbooks are a common source of an implied contract 
right to job security. The transformation of employee handbooks from gratuitous expressions of em-
ployer policy to enforceable legal obligations provides a vivid illustration of the declining adherence 
to the employment-at-will rule.”); John Giovannone, Note, In the Wake of Hurricane Asmus: A Lost 
Opportunity in Our Struggle with Employment Handbooks, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1687, 1694 (2004) 
(“The employee handbook is arguably the most established and important illustration of the corporate 
policy exception to at-will employment.”). 
 139 See Giovannone, supra note 138, at 1697–98 (explaining that some employers change compa-
ny policies by issuing modified or amended employee handbooks). 
 140 See Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 137, at 246–51 (criticizing employers’ overly-broad policies 
that forbid consensual relationships between employees). 
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arrangements, operating hours and rules, and grievance procedures.141 Policies 
can also touch on discrimination in the workplace, and employers frequently 
adopt anti-harassment and anti-discrimination procedures that inform employ-
ees what to do if they believe that they have been subject to illegal workplace 
conduct.142 It is not uncommon for workplace policies to also include infor-
mation on health and safety, and to inform employees how to act in the context 
of a dangerous situation.143 Key for purposes of this discussion is that an em-
ployment policy (1) can affect the terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment and (2) can impact workers across the entire company. 
Because employer policies are often formal and uniform across a busi-
ness, they frequently present a common set of facts for numerous plaintiffs. As 
these policies are so widespread in the workplace, they also give rise to a 
common issue that could be certified under Rule 23(c)(4). The courts and liti-
gants could thus save enormous judicial resources by resolving any workplace 
claims that touch on a common policy a single time, while litigating the re-
maining issues in the case separately. For example, a court could examine 
whether an employer’s policy on healthcare discriminates against a particular 
religious group, or whether a business’s pay platform negatively affects wom-
en. By resolving these questions only once in a case through Rule 23(c)(4), 
each individual plaintiff would not have to relitigate the issues. 
Issue class certification can be particularly helpful in disparate impact 
cases. In a disparate impact case, an employer has violated Title VII by adopt-
ing an employment policy that is facially neutral, but nonetheless has a dis-
criminatory impact on workers for which there is no business justification.144 
The Supreme Court first recognized a claim for disparate impact in 1971.145 
Congress subsequently codified this cause of action in Title VII as part of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.146 A plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim must 
set forth the policy in question that gives rise to the adverse effect.147 For ex-
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Richard Harrison Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will Con-
tracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 196 (“An employee handbook typically informs the employee about 
grievance and termination procedures, severance pay, insurance, vacation pay, and general operating 
rules.”). 
 142 See Ho, supra note 137, at 142 (noting the rise in sexual harassment policies following the 
Supreme Court rulings on the issue). 
 143 See generally Rowena M. Durán, Note, The Employer’s Dilemma: The Implications of Occu-
pational Safety and Health in the Arbitral Process—Conflicting Contractual and Statutory Com-
mands, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1067 (1983) (discussing various employer safety and health policies 
and issues). 
 144 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012) (setting forth the statutory prohibition for disparate im-
pact). 
 145 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971). 
 146 See Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?, 
90 B.U. L. REV. 2181, 2185–95 (2010) (discussing the history of disparate impact and its codification 
into law). 
 147 See id. at 2194. 
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ample, an employer might have a policy requiring that its employees have a 
high school diploma. Given the educational opportunities available to certain 
minority groups in particular areas of the country, such a policy could have a 
disparate impact on those groups. This was the central question in the 1971 
case Griggs v. Duke Power Co., in which the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployer’s policy requiring that employees hold a high school diploma and take 
an IQ test violated the disparate impact provisions of Title VII.148 
Moreover, because disparate impact claims typically affect large numbers 
of workers, issue class certification would be particularly appropriate for these 
claims.149 Disparate impact claims involve a common policy that affects nu-
merous employees in the workplace. Any questions as to that policy could be 
certified for a single resolution. Thus, in Griggs, the question of whether a di-
ploma requirement had a statistical disparate impact on a protected group 
could have been certified for review.150 Rule 23(c)(4) could have also been 
used to determine whether the employer had a business necessity for adopting 
the policy, and whether there were alternative policies available that would 
have served the employer’s business goals yet had less of a discriminatory im-
pact on the workforce.151 
Company policies, then, provide an area of enormous potential for issue 
class certification in the employment discrimination context. As these policies 
involve a similar set of facts among numerous workers, cases that implicate 
corporate rules may be particularly appropriate for Rule 23(c)(4) review. Dis-
parate impact claims, which inherently involve corporate policy, are thus one 
subset of workplace litigation that would benefit greatly from the use of the 
issue class.152 
2. Common Personnel 
Workplaces, by their very nature, involve the same managers, presidents, 
and executive officers. Many employees—sometimes hundreds or thousands—
will thus end up sharing a particular boss at the same company. The decisions 
of these managers or supervisors will often end up impacting an entire class of 
workers. For example, a supervisor could treat women in a negative way, or 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See 401 U.S. at 432. 
 149 See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 911, 968 (2005) (noting that “disparate impact is conceived of as class-based litigation, 
typically pursued either in formal class actions or by the EEOC in pattern and practice cases”). 
 150 See 401 U.S. at 427–28 (noting that the company policy of requiring a high school education 
applied to all employees). 
 151 See id. at 431–36 (noting that the diploma requirement was not “a reasonable measure of job 
performance”). 
 152 See generally Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: 
Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95 (2006) (discussing the role of poli-
cies in disparate impact law). 
140 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:121 
may only allow white employees to be promoted within the company.153 Simi-
larly, the company president may make a discriminatory comment or remark at 
a meeting in front of the entire workforce.154 Or, a regional manager might 
send out an email that disparages a particular group.155 
Because the “players” in employment discrimination cases tend to be the 
same at a particular company, there may often be similar issues among plain-
tiffs when these same “players” are involved. Rather than resolving these is-
sues multiple times, Rule 23(c)(4) would allow the court to answer questions 
involving common personnel once. Thus, the court could address on a class-
wide basis whether a manager’s email was discriminatory, whether the presi-
dent’s comments were disparaging, or whether a particular supervisor held a 
negative animus towards women. 
In addition, it is also common for there to be more technical questions in 
employment cases, including whether the statutory minimum for employees 
has been satisfied, or whether the workforce is large enough to permit the max-
imum award of compensatory and punitive damages.156 Or, there might be a 
question as to whether a particular individual at the company satisfies the stat-
utory definition of being a “supervisor,” which could have important ramifica-
tions in particular workplace cases.157 Similarly, it is not uncommon for a court 
to address the question of whether or not workers are employees or independ-
ent contractors under a particular statute.158 A court could resolve these ques-
tions, which all involve issues pertaining to common personnel, a single time 
pursuant to issue class certification. A single jury could thus determine the size 
of a particular workforce, whether certain workers are truly employees, and 
which workers constitute management personnel. Although the individual is-
sues could vary significantly in each case, courts can address these common 
questions to help streamline the broader litigation. 
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3. Common Practices 
Beyond similar policies and personnel, workplaces often involve common 
practices.159 These practices tend to be more informal in nature, and are often 
more of an issue of corporate culture than written policy.160 For example, it 
may simply be the particular practice at a business to consider a worker for 
partnership after eight years of practice. Or, it may be unspoken precedent that 
an employee who is late to work more than five times is automatically termi-
nated. Or, it may be the practice of workers not to use their accrued vacation 
time or sick leave because it is frowned upon at the company. 
These types of practices may have a discriminatory effect on certain 
groups.161 The above vacation time example could negatively impact women 
more than men, if it could be established that this group has a greater need to 
use time off for family responsibilities.162 Regardless of the alleged discrimina-
tory practice, however, Rule 23(c)(4) offers a potential benefit in this area. The 
question of whether a particular practice even exists at a company—and if that 
practice does exist, whether it has a discriminatory impact—could be resolved 
class-wide without the need for individual litigation. 
4. Individual Variances 
Employment discrimination claims offer numerous similarities and often 
share common personnel, policies and practices.163 Nonetheless, each work-
place claim also tends to be unique, as individual employees differ in many 
respects. 
The most notable difference among discrimination claims is the damages 
that individual workers can claim.164 Even where workplace claims arise from 
the same set of facts, the relief available to plaintiffs will vary tremendously 
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 160 See id. (“Notwithstanding the legalities, employers established their own, often informal, rules 
and practices in the absence of comprehensive state regulation. For example, beginning in the late 
19th century many American employers began instituting hierarchical job ladders, specific job classi-
fication systems, seniority systems, and employee retention policies . . . .”); cf. Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984) (“In the context of Title VII, the contract of employment may be 
written or oral, formal or informal . . . .”). 
 161 See Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 699, 738 (1986). 
 162 See id. (“[T]he courts have indicated that the absence of an adequate leave policy could violate 
Title VII because of its disproportionate impact on women. While women would be affected by the 
absence of a general disability leave policy to the same extent as men, women would still bear the 
additional burden of pregnancy disability.”). 
 163 See supra notes 137–162 and accompanying text. 
 164 See Senn, supra note 24, at 193–97 (discussing the different types of damages available to 
plaintiffs under federal discrimination laws). 
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across workers.165 This is true for two reasons. First, the financial ramifications 
that each employee suffers as a result of the discrimination can be different. 
This is because employees often have different rates of pay and different career 
paths.166 The specific amount of damages each employee experiences will 
therefore have to be determined on a case-by-case basis.167 
Second, compensatory damages also vary substantially across a work-
force.168 In employment discrimination cases, compensatory damages are typi-
cally comprised of emotional harm and psychological suffering that results 
from an employer’s discrimination.169 These types of damages are, by their 
very nature, individualized.170 The fact-finder will thus have to make a case-
specific determination as to the amount of harm each individual suffered by 
evaluating that particular employee’s claim.171 
Beyond the differences in financial and psychological harm, other vari-
ances in employment discrimination cases exist. For example, in a disability 
discrimination case, plaintiffs may allege that the employer has a policy of fail-
ing to reasonably accommodate individual workers.172 Such a policy could 
violate federal law across a class of employees.173 Yet, the fact finder would 
need to make an individual determination as to what accommodation would be 
appropriate for each specific worker.174 Thus, although financial and psycho-
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logical harm are the two most common variances in employment cases, other 
differences exist based upon the facts of an individual’s case. 
As demonstrated, employment discrimination cases often have much in 
common. Systemic discrimination claims frequently involve common policies, 
practices, and personnel, though other similarities are often also present. At the 
same time, workplace claims are almost universally different because the dam-
ages available to individual workers vary greatly. These damages depend heav-
ily on each worker’s particular position and the amount of pain and suffering 
each employee experiences.175 
Workplace claims are therefore particularly appropriate for certification 
under Rule 23(c)(4). Given that these claims will inherently vary across a 
class, they will not be suitable for traditional class treatment under Rule 23(b), 
as Wal-Mart demonstrates. And, as these systemic cases will often arise from 
the same set of facts and involve the same polices, practices, and personnel, 
there will often be overlapping issues that could be peeled off and certified as 
an issue class. Courts can therefore streamline litigation by resolving these 
common issues on a class basis under Rule 23(c)(4). 
5. The Sexual Harassment Example 
Issue class certification’s value in employment cases is best seen through 
an example: sexual harassment. Hostile work environment cases are one of the 
most frequently filed claims under Title VII.176 These claims allege that hostili-
ty on the basis of sex permeates the working environment.177 Common evi-
dence in these cases often involves workers’ sexual jokes, touching, and com-
ments, as well as the employer’s policies and practices.178 Critical inquiries in 
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these cases include whether the company knew or should have known about 
the harassment, and whether it took any remedial action.179 Similarly, whether 
the company had implemented and maintained an effective anti-harassment 
policy will often go directly to the issue of liability in the case.180 
Hostile work environments tend to impact several workers because the hos-
tility will cut across an entire workforce. Thus, many workers are often affected 
when employers permit hostility, resulting in class action claims.181 Sexual har-
assment will often not be appropriate for traditional class certification under 
Rule 23(b), however, because individuals suffer different kinds and degrees of 
harm.182 The harassment will certainly vary with regard to intensity for each in-
dividual plaintiff.183 Further, workers will perceive the harassment differently.184 
Finally, specific acts of harassment may be targeted directly at individual work-
ers. This type of discrimination is inherently individual in nature. 
Nonetheless, classes asserting systemic hostile work environment claims 
bear numerous similarities. Often, the same harassers will be involved in the 
conduct, and courts may need to resolve the question of whether certain com-
ments, jokes, or emails were sent to the workforce class-wide.185 Also, the 
question of what management knew and how it responded to the harassment 
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will be critical to the entire litigation, because company practices for address-
ing discrimination will go directly to the question of liability.186 Similarly, in-
vestigations into the harassment claims may impact numerous cases, and the 
notes and records that develop from those investigations could have a class-
wide impact. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the validity and effective-
ness of the company’s anti-harassment policy will impact all workers bringing 
a sexual harassment claim against a common employer.187 These common 
questions in a sexual harassment case—which involve overlapping personnel, 
practices, and policies—can be separated out from the individual litigation and 
resolved on a class basis through the use of Rule 23(c)(4). Then, the remaining 
questions in the case can still be addressed through individual litigation.188 
For example, in a case involving allegations of company-wide workplace 
hostility, it may be important to know: (1) whether the company distributed a 
sexual harassment policy to all employees; (2) whether the company properly 
trained the individuals identified in the policy to address complaints of har-
assment; and (3) whether upper management properly followed the harassment 
policy.189 These questions go directly to the employer’s defenses and liabil-
ity.190 Because these issues will impact employer liability each time an em-
ployee alleges harassment, they could be resolved a single time pursuant to 
issue class certification. A jury could thus examine each of these issues and 
render a finding that would bind the entire class. Then, the remaining issues 
would be litigated like any other case of discrimination.191 
This use of issue class certification makes Rule 23(c)(4) extremely ap-
pealing. The issue class allows courts to address complex factual questions 
only once, saving enormous judicial resources. And, it still permits the indi-
vidual litigation to proceed as it would otherwise. Litigating the remaining is-
sues separately is important given that each plaintiff will have undergone dif-
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ferent experiences, and will have suffered varying degrees of harassment.192 
Doing so will also lead to different findings on liability and diverse damages 
with respect to individual plaintiffs.193 The typical systemic harassment claim, 
then, will not be appropriate for traditional Rule 23(b) class treatment. It will, 
however, often be extremely appropriate for issue class certification under 
Rule 23(c)(4) on specific issues. 
Sexual harassment thus provides an excellent example—in one of the 
most commonly brought employment discrimination claims—of how Rule 
23(c)(4) can help manage a systemic discrimination case. More broadly, class-
wide employment claims are particularly appropriate for issue certification. It 
is therefore clear that Rule 23(c)(4) can help streamline litigation and bring 
efficiency to systemic discrimination claims. Given the uncertainty of class-
based litigation after Wal-Mart, the issue class is likely the best tool for the 
courts and litigants to address common issues arising in the workplace. 
C. McReynolds: Judge Posner’s View of the Issue Class 
As outlined above, the issue class has enormous promise following Wal-
Mart. But the possibilities for plaintiffs are more than theoretical. In fact, 
Judge Posner recently invoked Rule 23(c)(4) in systemic litigation brought 
against one of the nation’s largest financial services firms. 
In 2012, in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that issues raised by 
plaintiffs in an employment case can be certified under Rule 23(c)(4) and de-
cided on a class-wide basis.194 The McReynolds court considered a race dis-
crimination case brought on behalf of seven hundred black brokers.195 The 
plaintiffs alleged that Merrill Lynch had discriminated against them under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by enacting certain company policies.196 
The plaintiffs moved for issue class certification under Rule 23(c)(4), asking 
that the court decide the “common issue” of “whether the defendant has en-
gaged and is engaging in practices that have a disparate impact . . . on the 
members of the class, in violation of federal antidiscrimination law.”197 The 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied certification, and 
the Seventh Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal on the issue.198 
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Specifically, the McReynolds plaintiffs alleged that the company had 
adopted two policies that discriminated against black brokers.199 First, the 
company had adopted a “teaming” policy whereby brokers were permitted—
but not required—to organize teams in particular offices.200 Although many 
brokers chose to work independently, those members on corporate teams 
“share[d] clients” and attempted to “gain access to additional clients.”201 The 
brokers—rather than an office supervisor or director—formed the teams them-
selves.202 Although brokers could be successful working alone, joining a team 
was seen as a way of doing well at the company.203 
Second, the plaintiffs challenged Merrill Lynch’s “account distribution” 
policy.204 Under that policy, when a broker departed from the company, that 
broker’s accounts were redistributed to other employees.205 Certain criteria, 
which measured the competing brokers’ prior success, helped determine who 
received the accounts.206 
Those two policies ultimately worked together to impact how brokers 
were evaluated.207 Moreover, a broker’s evaluation played a part in pay and 
promotion at the company.208 The plaintiffs maintained that both policies were 
applied in a way that discriminated against black workers and impacted their 
pay.209 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that white brokers “are more com-
fortable” working and teaming with other white brokers.210 Although race did 
not always motivate how brokers were chosen to join a team, “emotions and 
preconceptions,” rather than “objective criteria,” played a major role.211 Thus, 
although management may not have had any racial motivation in adopting this 
policy, the policy nonetheless resulted in an adverse disparate impact against 
black employees when they were excluded from the more profitable teams.212 
Similarly, the plaintiffs also alleged that the account distribution policy 
had a disparate impact against black workers.213 Because white brokers were 
disproportionately members of more successful teams, their revenues tended to 
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be higher than those of black brokers.214 Thus, when accounts were redistribut-
ed at the company, white workers received those accounts at a disproportion-
ately high rate.215 The two policies thus worked together to create a “vicious 
cycle” where the “spiral effect” was “disadvantageous to black brokers.”216 
African-American brokers thus earned less than their white counterparts at the 
company.217 
Judge Posner, writing for the panel, determined that the question of 
whether these two polices violated Title VII should be answered as part of an 
issue class under Rule 23(c)(4).218 For the first time, the court analyzed the 
question specifically in the context of the Wal-Mart decision. It noted that it 
may seem “perverse” to consider certifying the class in light of the Supreme 
Court’s apprehension of systemic litigation, but noted that the Court’s decision 
provided substantial guidance on the class action mechanism.219 
Judge Posner emphasized that although there was no evidence of discrim-
inatory intent, such intent is unnecessary in a disparate impact case brought 
under Title VII.220 The court further noted that the question at this stage of the 
proceedings is whether the disparate impact claims are “most efficiently de-
termined on a class-wide basis rather than in 700 individual lawsuits.”221 Giv-
en that the two policies may work together in causing the discrimination, and 
that the policies may have an “incremental causal [discriminatory] effect,” they 
are most appropriately decided as part of a single suit.222 
In the decision, Judge Posner differentiated between an issue class claim, 
like the one asserted in McReynolds, and a broader class action case under 
Rule 23(b), like the one brought in Wal-Mart.223 He explained: 
Obviously a single proceeding . . . could not resolve class members’ 
claims. Each class member would have to prove that his compensa-
tion had been adversely affected by the corporate policies, and by 
how much. . . . But at least it wouldn’t be necessary in each of those 
trials to determine whether the challenged practices were unlawful. 
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Rule 23(c)(4) . . . . [thus brings efficiency] on a class-wide basis 
. . . .224 
The court also addressed a critical policy question that Wal-Mart raised: 
whether the enormity of the certified class could force the defendant to settle 
the matter.225 Unlike the broad Wal-Mart-type class action brought under Rule 
23(b), however, issue class certification does not raise the stakes to the level of 
requiring a defendant to gamble “one’s company on a single jury verdict.”226 
Rather, the financial services firm in McReynolds “is in no danger of being 
destroyed” if it receives an adverse verdict, particularly where only seven hun-
dred plaintiffs are involved.227 
In overturning the district court and permitting the issue class, the Sev-
enth Circuit noted that it had “trouble seeing the downside of the limited class 
action treatment.”228 The court thus certified the class under Rule 23(c)(4) and 
allowed the specific issues the plaintiffs raised to be decided on a class-wide 
basis.229 The court further advised that if it decided the class-wide issues in 
favor of the plaintiffs, hundreds of individual suits for monetary damages 
might follow.230 But such suits would be streamlined, as the court would not 
have to revisit whether the company violated Title VII in each individual 
case.231 
In the end, it was clear that Judge Posner saw the value and role of the is-
sue class under Rule 23(c)(4). Although he clearly understood and considered 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in rejecting a Rule 23(b) class in Wal-Mart, 
Judge Posner saw no “downside” to the more “limited class action” brought in 
McReynolds.232 Certifying narrow issues in the case would not threaten the 
existence of the company or cause it to settle, and would help to streamline 
future litigation in the individual cases.233 Indeed, it is worth noting that were 
the defendant to win on the class-wide questions that were certified, the case 
itself would be over, which would prevent the unnecessary litigation of hun-
dreds of federal suits. 
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The McReynolds case, then, provides a superb example of how systemic 
litigation can still thrive after Wal-Mart, particularly in the employment dis-
crimination context. As already addressed, where an employer permits em-
ployment discrimination to occur in a single instance, it is more likely to be 
widespread across the company. Common management and policies at a busi-
ness thus provide common facts that may overlap between cases. Although the 
specifics of any individual case may vary among plaintiffs, there will be in-
stances where courts can decide common polices and issues uniformly. As 
Judge Posner notes, where it is possible to resolve these common issues on a 
class-wide basis, there is a substantial opportunity to streamline the entire pro-
cess and bring judicial efficiency to the case.234 Rule 23(c)(4) provides the 
procedural mechanism to do so. Even after Wal-Mart, then, the procedural 
rules allow for plaintiffs to pursue—and prevail—in having specific issues de-
cided on a class-wide basis. 
D. Wal-Mart Revisited 
With a more thorough understanding of the issue class and how it has 
been applied, it is worth revisiting the Wal-Mart case under Rule 23(c)(4). As 
already discussed, Wal-Mart was brought as a broad class action on behalf of 
one and a half million plaintiffs seeking to certify their case as a single uniform 
proceeding under Rule 23(b).235 The Supreme Court ultimately rejected this 
certification, finding that there was no commonality among the claims.236 
There was simply too much variance across the stores and plaintiffs in the case 
to warrant class treatment.237 
There has been substantial debate as to whether this case was properly de-
cided.238 Putting this debate aside, however, it is fair to ask what the case would 
have looked like if it had been brought as a more limited class action under Rule 
23(c)(4). As McReynolds demonstrates, the issue class has far-reaching potential 
for employment discrimination claims.239 The facts of Wal-Mart provide an ex-
cellent example of how the issue class could help reinvigorate systemic work-
place claims. It is useful to reexamine these facts from the perspective of Rule 
23(c)(4) to better understand how that Rule can be used in practice. 
One alternative way that the Wal-Mart plaintiffs could have proceeded, 
then, would have been to pursue a more limited class certification on specific 
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issues raised in the case. Although there are a myriad of strategic ways to for-
mulate specific issues across the stores, there are two particular possibilities 
that jump quickly to mind.240 First, the plaintiffs could have sought to certify 
only the question of whether the discretion given to management in determin-
ing pay and promotion issues discriminated against female employees.241 Sec-
ond, the plaintiffs could further have sought to certify this issue only as to spe-
cific stores in specific regions of the country. If the issue was resolved in favor 
of the plaintiffs on these claims, the individual cases could have proceeded 
against the company to determine the appropriate level of damages.242 The 
question of the validity of the pay and promotion policy, however, would not 
have needed to be reexamined. 
Thus, the issue in the case would have been narrower in two senses. First, 
certification would have only been sought on the single issue of the store poli-
cy. Second, certification would have only applied to a narrow geographic re-
gion. Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the plaintiffs would have been 
far more likely to prevail on this type of limited certification. Specifically, the 
Court repeatedly emphasized that the proposed class was simply too big and 
too diverse to permit certification.243 As the Court explained, “Other than the 
bare existence of delegated discretion, respondents have identified no ‘specific 
employment practice’—much less one that ties all their 1.5 million claims to-
gether.”244 The claims thus varied too much across too many stores around the 
country to warrant class treatment.245 Underscoring the diversity and size of 
the class, the Court noted: 
Some managers will claim that the availability of women, or quali-
fied women, or interested women, in their stores’ area does not mir-
ror the national or regional statistics. And almost all of them will 
claim to have been applying some sex-neutral, performance-based 
criteria—whose nature and effects will differ from store to store.246 
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That problem would cease to exist under the issue class proposed here. 
By choosing to proceed against particular stores or stores in particular regions, 
there would likely be many more common elements to the individual claims. 
For individual stores, there would be a common set of managers, employees, 
and policies. For regional claims, multiple stores may share common employ-
ees or supervisors, and managerial staff may discuss and share pay and promo-
tion policies. The issue addressed would thus be singular: whether the pay and 
promotion policy at the store (or in the region) adversely impacted female 
workers. 
By litigating the case through this more limited class mechanism, the 
Court’s objections to the class treatment in Wal-Mart would fall by the way-
side. The Court’s primary concern—the lack of commonality in the case—
would not be a problem where a single issue was sought to be resolved in an 
individual store or in a geographically narrow grouping of stores.247 Rather, the 
targeted geographical scope of the class would help bring “some glue” to hold 
the “employment decisions” in the case together.248 
Similarly, the pure size of the class sought in Wal-Mart would have 
threatened the business itself.249 By pursuing a more limited issue class in the 
case, this threat would no longer exist. Like the defendant in McReynolds, 
then, Wal-Mart would be “in no danger of being destroyed” if it received an 
adverse verdict on the issue certified, particularly where the classes are more 
limited in nature.250 A narrower issue decided with fewer plaintiffs substantial-
ly limits the risk for the company. 
At the same time, there would be a number of benefits to pursuing the is-
sue class. Most importantly, the certification of the issue would help streamline 
the proceedings. It would allow the most important issue in the case—the le-
gality of Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion policies—to be resolved on a broader 
basis across regional stores. As the case stands now, the courts may be flooded 
with one and a half million claims from the individual plaintiffs that would 
need to be resolved.251 The issue class would help consolidate this litigation, 
and would allow the issue to be resolved in a uniform way. Additionally, there 
would still be an incentive for the defendant to settle the case where the issue 
class has been certified.252 A defendant may not want to risk an adverse ruling 
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in those courts, and the issue class would thus encourage settlement. Neverthe-
less, the risk of losing the case would not be as daunting to the company, and 
any settlement would likely be more reasonable in nature.253 
It is thus interesting to consider what Wal-Mart would have looked like 
had the plaintiffs pursued an issue class under Rule 23(c)(4) rather than a 
broader class under Rule 23(b). More limited class treatment of the case would 
still have created substantial judicial economies for the courts and litigants, 
and would still have encouraged settlement in the case. At the same time, how-
ever, the issue class would not present make-or-break litigation for the compa-
ny.254 Considering Wal-Mart in this light reveals an important lesson for future 
employment discrimination litigants pursuing systemic claims: where a class 
may be too large or varied to warrant broad class treatment, the plaintiffs 
should strongly consider a narrowed approach under Rule 23(c)(4). 
Ultimately, it is impossible to know how the Supreme Court would have 
reacted to an “issue class” brought against Wal-Mart, and whether the Court 
would have upheld that type of certification. Further, there are numerous other 
ways that an issue class could have been pursued than the one set forth here. 
Nonetheless, the objections the Court and litigants in Wal-Mart raised are less 
likely to exist with the more limited issue class, and it is far more likely that 
the Court would have approved the litigation. This is particularly true because 
the case itself was decided by a narrow 5-4 margin.255 Certainly, the lower 
courts, like the Seventh Circuit in McReynolds, could see Rule 23(c)(4) as a 
way of helping consolidate massive litigation while still heeding the Supreme 
Court’s warnings in Wal-Mart. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ISSUE CLASS 
In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court held that a 
class of one and a half million plaintiffs could not be certified under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b).256 As already noted in this Article, there is no 
complete substitute for the traditional Rule 23(b) class action.257 Nonetheless, 
in assessing the legal landscape post Wal-Mart, issue class certification is the 
best remaining tool available for workers to pursue systemic employment dis-
crimination claims. The issue class presents a number of advantages for the 
courts and litigants, but there are also some noteworthy drawbacks. This Part 
first addresses the benefits of using the issue class in employment discrimina-
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tion cases.258 Next, it addresses the drawbacks of the Rule.259 Finally, it situ-
ates the discussion within the context of the broader academic scholarship.260 
Perhaps the issue class’s most substantial benefit is the flexibility it brings 
to the judiciary.261 Rule 23(c)(4) provides the courts substantial freedom in 
managing a class case.262 Specifically, the trial judge can examine the case and 
decide how best to separate out those issues that are ripe for collective deter-
mination. And, because an issue class can be certified at any point in the case, 
it provides enormous latitude for the court to determine how a systemic case 
should proceed. 
By permitting this type of flexibility, Rule 23(c)(4) streamlines litiga-
tion.263 It separates common issues in a case for collective determination, while 
allowing the remainder of each case to proceed individually.264 This process 
makes the proceedings more efficient and efficacious.265 Specifically, it avoids 
duplicate litigation because common issues are resolved in a single action. The 
process therefore saves judicial and litigant resources, and streamlines system-
ic litigation. 
Employment discrimination cases are particularly appropriate for Rule 
23(c)(4) certification.266 As discussed, these claims’ inherent commonality—
including common policies, personnel, and procedures—is well-suited for issue 
class certification. The issue class should thus strongly be considered in any sys-
temic employment discrimination case, as use of Rule 23(c)(4) can streamline 
the proceedings, and allow the case to proceed in a more efficient and effective 
manner. Similarly, as there are many individualized inquiries that must be ad-
dressed in employment cases, use of the traditional Rule 23(b) mechanism is 
often  inappropriate for these cases, as Wal-Mart clearly shows.267 As courts be-
come more focused on the commonality requirement following Wal-Mart, then, 
Rule 23(c)(4) will become a much more important tool for pursuing class-wide 
workplace claims. 
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Despite the great promise of the issue class, however, there are also many 
drawbacks relevant to traditional class certification under Rule 23(b).268 Most 
notably, the issue class is not as efficient as Rule 23(b) certification of an entire 
class. Because Rule 23(c)(4) only allows certification of a portion of the case, 
it is simply less efficient, as a number of issues in each case will still have to 
be resolved on an individual basis.269 Issue class certification can thus be more 
cumbersome compared to the traditional class action. 
Additionally, from the plaintiff’s perspective, issue class claims yield 
smaller settlements than traditional class claims.270 This is because a class cer-
tified under Rule 23(c)(4) will typically not concern employers as much as tra-
ditional class actions brought under Rule 23(b), as the adverse resolution of a 
particular issue may still permit the employer to avoid liability and/or substan-
tial damages in the case. As Judge Posner acknowledged, certifying narrow 
issues in a case will likely not threaten a company’s existence.271 Employers 
may therefore not be as eager to settle a case certified under Rule 23(c)(4). 
Similarly, many individual employment discrimination cases arising out 
of the same facts may have only marginal value.272 Although some issues can 
be certified on a class basis in these cases, the damages portion of each case 
will likely proceed in an individualized manner. Thus, many plaintiffs with 
smaller dollar claims may be reluctant to pursue systemic litigation that does 
not arise out of Rule 23(b) litigation, as there may be little financial incentive 
to do so.273 This will allow some employers to avoid feeling the full impact of 
their discrimination under the civil rights laws, as not all plaintiffs will join in 
the litigation even where a particular issue has been certified. Similarly, Rule 
23(b) class claims allow a more relaxed approach to the administrative filing 
requirements of the Federal Rules for employment discrimination claims.274 
Rule 23(c)(4) is likely not as permissive, and many potential plaintiffs that 
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have not satisfied the administrative requirements of the statute will fall 
through the cracks of the case.275 Again, this will result in a smaller class size 
and a reduced impact on the employer for its wrongdoing. 
In the end, there is simply no complete substitute for the traditional class 
claim. The reality of Wal-Mart, however, is that the traditional class action is 
forever changed for employment discrimination plaintiffs. These plaintiffs 
need solutions to the problems the Supreme Court’s decision created. And the 
issue class is simply the best procedural tool available for permitting work-
place plaintiffs to pursue systemic discrimination claims. Despite its shortcom-
ings, then, the issue class offers enormous promise for employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs. The issue class offers flexibility to the courts, and streamlined, 
efficient litigation for the parties involved. Rule 23(c)(4) should thus be strong-
ly considered in any systemic workplace litigation, as the issue class is an ef-
fective tool for employment plaintiffs. 
Finally, it should be noted that there is nothing prohibiting plaintiffs from 
bringing a traditional Rule 23(b) class action, and then pursuing an issue class 
if the traditional class is denied.276 Thus, from a strategic standpoint, plaintiffs 
need not decide at the outset of the case between Rule 23(b) and Rule 23(c)(4). 
Instead, if the plaintiffs believe that they should pursue the case as a traditional 
class action, they should proceed on that basis. If certification is denied, the 
plaintiffs can still pursue the issue class at a subsequent time. Indeed, one of 
the great benefits of the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class is that it can be used at any 
time in the case to help streamline the proceedings. Plaintiffs thus need not 
gamble by asking the court for either a traditional class or the issue class, and 
can instead seek both forms of certification in the alternative. 
As already discussed, much has been written on Wal-Mart generally.277 The 
vast majority of this scholarship has denounced the decision as problematic for 
civil rights plaintiffs. Little has been written, however, on potential solutions to 
the Supreme Court’s decision. Shortly after Wal-Mart was decided, several 
scholars began discussing possible ways to address the problems facing systemic 
employment discrimination plaintiffs.278 One scholar suggested that plaintiffs 
could pursue class action claims smaller in size than the class in Wal-Mart to 
litigate these cases effectively.279 Another scholar made several suggestions for 
plaintiffs to consider when bringing systemic discrimination claims.280 This schol-
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ar highlighted different procedural mechanisms that plaintiffs could pursue, and 
also raised the possibility of an enhanced role for governmental litigation and the 
potential for congressional intervention.281 
Although these early voices briefly raised some possible solutions to the 
Wal-Mart dilemma, the legal academy has primarily focused on the problem 
itself rather than ways of resolving the issue. This Article continues the discus-
sion that other scholars began, and explores how workplace plaintiffs can best 
proceed after the Supreme Court’s decision. This Article thoroughly explains 
that issue class certification is the best tool available to employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs and highlights the benefits and drawbacks of that potential tool. 
To date, the academic scholarship has not identified Rule 23(c)(4) as a 
possible response to Wal-Mart. Indeed, very little had been written on issue 
class certification even prior to the Supreme Court’s decision. Moreover, the 
existing scholarship is conflicting. For example, one scholar has criticized the 
expansive view of Rule 23(c)(4) that some courts have adopted.282 This scholar 
argues that the Rule, “in its current form, simply cannot authorize an issue 
class action end-run around the predominance requirement for class actions 
that otherwise would fail to satisfy that requirement.”283 In contrast, other 
commentators believe that Rule 23(c)(4) should play a larger role in class ac-
tion litigation, and can be more effectively used than the traditional Rule 23(b) 
type class.284 One such commentator argues that the class action should not 
result in “an all-or-nothing decision to aggregate individual cases.”285 Instead, 
issue class certification can be used to isolate specific issues to be litigated.286 
Regardless of how issue class certification was used prior to Wal-Mart, 
Rule 23(c)(4) now offers the best available way for plaintiffs to pursue system-
ic discrimination claims. The Supreme Court’s decision has essentially re-
solved any conflict as to whether the traditional class action or the issue class 
is more effective for employment discrimination claims. Because Wal-Mart 
substantially raises the bar for class action workplace plaintiffs, these litigants 
may be best served by pursuing a more limited systemic claim in the form of 
the issue class. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is a growing body of literature criticizing the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Wal-Mart. This scholarship emphasizes that the case may undermine 
the civil rights protections of workers across the country. The arguments these 
scholars have set forth are well founded, but it is now time to move past this 
debate. A more helpful line of inquiry should focus on how plaintiffs can navi-
gate around the Supreme Court’s decision. This Article offers a discussion of 
the benefits and drawbacks of the best tool currently available for pursuing 
systemic employment discrimination claims: issue class certification. Although 
the traditional class action under Rule 23(b) remains the preferred mechanism 
for systemic litigation, all workplace plaintiffs should strongly consider the 
issue class following Wal-Mart. 
This Article seeks to spark a dialogue on the ways that Rule 23(c)(4) can 
be used to assist civil rights claimants in a post Wal-Mart world. A discussion 
of how to litigate cases after the Supreme Court’s decision—rather than a dis-
cussion of the flaws of the case itself—is far more helpful to plaintiffs pursu-
ing employment discrimination claims. Although the issue class is not the only 
way to litigate class-wide workplace cases, it is likely the best way. Beyond 
offering a full discussion of the issue class, then, this Article also invites a dia-
logue on any additional means of addressing the Supreme Court’s decision. 
Wal-Mart has unquestionably changed the playing field. It is now time to reas-
sess how plaintiffs should play the game. 
